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# Intelligence Report

No. 7944

THE MIKOYAN VISIT: AN APPRAISAL

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE  
AND RESEARCH



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Abstract .....	iii
A. Events of Visit .....	1
B. Probable Reasons for the Trip .....	2
1. Fact-Finding Mission .....	2
2. Place US on Defensive .....	2
3. Other Reasons .....	4
C. Mikoyan's Position on Substantive Issues .....	5
1. Berlin.....	5
2. Germany .....	7
3. European Security .....	8
4. Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests .....	10
5. UN Committee on Outer Space .....	10
6. Other Disarmament Issues .....	11
7. Trade .....	12
8. Propaganda .....	13
9. Peaceful Coexistence, International Contacts, and a Summit Conference .....	14
10. International Communism .....	16
11. Cultural Relations .....	16
12. Hungary and Eastern Europe .....	16
13. Soviet Equality .....	18
14. Middle East .....	19

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881137-149

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~  
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Page</u>
15. China .....	19
16. Air Incidents .....	20
D. Major Themes of Public Statements .....	21
E. Probable Impact on Mikoyan and Soviet Leadership .....	22
1. Mikoyan's Political Personality .....	22
2. US Wealth and Strength .....	22
3. Statements in Moscow .....	23
4. General Impressions of Reception .....	26
5. American Public Opinion .....	26
6. Official US Views .....	27
F. Probable Impact on Soviet Public Opinion .....	29
G. Probable Impact on American Public Opinion .....	30

Annexes

1. Itinerary of Mikoyan in the US .....	31
2. Collection of Mikoyan's Published Statements in the US .....	42

881137-150

Abstract

The two major purposes of Mikoyan's trip were probably: first, and foremost, to sound out the US position on Berlin and a German peace treaty as well as on other issues; and second, to place US foreign policy on the defensive by stimulating a campaign for a US-Soviet rapprochement. The Soviet leaders probably calculated that if Soviet appeals for a rapprochement met a favorable response from the American public, this would generate pressure for accommodation to certain Soviet demands. And if US leaders failed, as Mikoyan put it, to answer "words" with "deeds," then Moscow would be in a more effective position to accuse US leaders of lack of good faith. This maneuver was probably based on a Soviet assessment, arrived at prior to Mikoyan's trip, that there was a growing trend in American public opinion in favor of improved relations with the USSR.

With the exception of his proposal for a conference on a German peace treaty (superseded by the Soviet note of January 10), Mikoyan made essentially no new proposals during his talks with US leaders, although he introduced a number of relatively minor amendments to existing Soviet positions.

-- On Berlin, Mikoyan played down the ultimative aspects of the Soviet "free City" proposal in an apparent effort to induce the US into negotiations on this scheme. At his Moscow press conference, he indicated that the USSR would delay action on transferring access controls for several weeks or months beyond the six month deadline if talks were then in progress. However, Mikoyan reiterated Soviet determination to carry out the transfer if no "satisfactory solution" of the Berlin problem was reached. He did not suggest a Western *quid pro quo* for a Soviet retreat on this commitment and warned that tanks would be met by tanks in the event of an Allied attempt to force a way to Berlin.

-- The emphasis which Mikoyan placed on Germany suggested that a further purpose of his trip was to pressure the US to be more receptive to Soviet proposals on the German problem. The chief novelty of the German peace treaty proposal was the suggestion that Moscow would be prepared to negotiate the Berlin problem in conjunction with this proposal. Mikoyan made clear that the USSR would still refuse to negotiate on the question of German reunification. He told the President that if no agreement could be reached on a peace treaty the Soviet bloc would have to find their own "independent way" to a solution. In a later talk with the West German Ambassador in Moscow, Khrushchev said that this "independent way" would be a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

-- On the discontinuance of nuclear tests, Mikoyan stated that the "main problem" was the voting procedure in the proposed control commission. He stated that some compromise could probably be found on

the West's "year-by-year" formula.

— On propaganda, Mikoyan indicated, in response to a suggestion from the Secretary, that he would review the Soviet propaganda line (on a basis of reciprocity) to see if it could be improved in any respect.

Concerning the impact of the trip on Mikoyan (and, through him, the other Soviet leaders), there seems to be little doubt that Mikoyan was impressed with the wealth and economic strength of the US. The Soviet leaders might, as a result of this impression, be more inclined in the future to take into account the realities of America's economic strength. On his return to Moscow, Mikoyan summed up his impressions of his visit by asserting that "increasing numbers of Americans" are in favor of improving relations with the USSR but that these views "have not yet found expression in any practical steps by the US Government." This line probably reflected accurately Mikoyan's true impressions of American public opinion, despite the fact that it had been set before his visit. At the same time Mikoyan was apparently impressed by the solid wall of public, bipartisan support for the US position on Berlin which he encountered. Thus, it seems possible that Mikoyan concluded that aggressive, assertive actions by the Soviet Union, threatening what the US generally considers as its legitimate interests, tend to solidify American public opinion and that broad, generalized appeals for US-Soviet collaboration are most likely to stimulate division of opinion in the US. Mikoyan seems to have received a double impression of the official US position on Berlin and Germany; of determination not to be forced out of Berlin but of willingness to negotiate, at least on the general subject of Germany. Mikoyan seemed genuinely annoyed at the US position on trade relations, but his speech at the Party Congress indicated resignation that US trade policies for the time being would not be changed. Both publicly and privately, Mikoyan criticized the overall US position on East-West issues as inflexible. However, he told the Party Congress that "the US statesmen expressed a readiness to negotiate disputed issues," gave a generally positive appraisal of his talks with US leaders, although he mildly rebuked Vice President Nixon and Secretary Dulles for making public statements allegedly not in accordance with their assurances to him.

The Soviet press and radio reported extensively on Mikoyan's trip, although it omitted a number of his public statements not in accordance with standard Soviet propaganda. Mikoyan's utterances of "sweet reasonableness" were reproduced at length and the impression was left that they were generally approved by his listeners. In view of the Soviet people's longing for peace and "relaxation of tensions," Moscow's initiative in sending Mikoyan to the US is likely to increase the prestige and popularity of the present Soviet leadership.

iv

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It was the consensus of American press comment that the Mikoyan visit disappointed both the extreme hopes and extreme fears which were expressed in advance: hopes that the visit might hasten some significant agreement on problems causing serious world tension, and fears that Americans would be "seduced" by clever propaganda.

v

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881137-153

## THE MIKOYAN VISIT: AN APPRAISAL

A. Events of Visit

On December 17, 1958 the Soviet Foreign Ministry requested a visa for Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan to go to the US as the guest of Ambassador Menshikov. He arrived in New York on January 4 after having stopped on the way in Copenhagen where he met Prime Minister Hansen. Proceeding direct from New York to Washington, he met Secretary Dulles on January 5 and the Vice President on January 6, and then departed for Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, and back to Washington where he met the Secretary again on January 16 and the President on January 17. On January 16 he also had lunch with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and attended a "business" dinner given by Secretary Dulles. In each city he visited he was the guest and speaker at a dinner arranged by prominent local personages, and his schedule also included a lunch with AFL-CIO leaders in Washington, a discussion with faculty members and students at UCLA, a press conference at UN headquarters in New York, a television interview with newsmen, a talk at the National Press Club in Washington, and tours of factories and shops. (See Annex 1 for schedule and itinerary.)

The meetings at which Mikoyan spoke were for the most part arranged in advance by the Soviet Embassy, which approached prominent personalities in the cities to be visited (when possible persons who had recently visited the USSR) with the request that such meetings be arranged. In some cases the meetings would, of course, have been arranged on the initiative of local civic leaders without the intervention of the Embassy, but it is interesting to note that particular efforts were made to ensure contacts with business circles.

Throughout most of the trip Mikoyan conducted himself with poise, tact, and affability. Only on a few occasions did he publicly show some irritation concerning his reception. While his intention to draw a distinction between the American people and their government was obvious, he for the most part avoided obvious improprieties. The phraseology of his talks was usually devoid of Marxist cliches and carefully chosen to appeal to the audience.

B. Probable Reasons for the Trip

Mikoyan was noncommittal when asked, while in the United States, about the purpose of his trip. He usually replied that he was on vacation. Be that as it may, Mikoyan's behavior and statements both during and after the trip and events preceding the trip provide fairly convincing evidence that he came to the United States at this time for two major purposes.

1. Fact-Finding Mission. During his talk with Secretary Dulles, Mikoyan denied in effect that he had come to the United States merely to become acquainted with the American people, stating that he had come here for a "different purpose" and hoped for "acceptable specific proposals from Secretary Dulles." This statement, viewed in the light of Mikoyan's performance in official talks, indicates that the primary purpose of his trip was to sound out US officials on various international issues, above all, on the questions of Berlin and Germany. That Mikoyan was mainly concerned in these talks with probing the US position is indicated by the fact that he introduced no essentially new proposals. And his preoccupation with Berlin and Germany was clear both from the amount of time he devoted to these subjects, from his frequent request for US counterproposals on the Soviet "free city" scheme and from the obvious fact that these are the dominant issues of the day. There can be little doubt that the Soviet leadership, in arranging the Mikoyan visit, hoped to test the US's determination to remain in Berlin and willingness to engage in talks on Berlin and related issues. It is even possible that there was not full agreement on these questions in the Kremlin and that the trip was arranged in order to conduct high-level talks with the US which would create the impression of Soviet vacillation or weakness. (See below.) Mikoyan's trip, in the probable Soviet view, also served the purpose of sounding out US officials on other outstanding issues and of gaining first-hand impressions of American political leaders, public opinion and material well-being.

2. Place US on Defensive. Moscow apparently calculates that the results of the 1958 congressional elections reflect popular dissatisfaction with American foreign policy and that this dissatisfaction can be exploited to Soviet advantage. The Mikoyan visit may have been designed in part to do just that. First, Mikoyan may have hoped to stimulate this dissatisfaction in order to bring about what the USSR would consider improvements in American foreign policy. By stressing peace and a US-Soviet rapprochement and by striking a friendly pose during his public appearances, Mikoyan apparently hoped to convince the American public that vigilant defense measures and a suspicious appraisal of Soviet intentions were unnecessary. On the question of trade, he openly appealed to public opinion over the head of the government. Second, Moscow may hope to place US foreign policy on the defensive by the mere fact of raising a hue and cry over the "growing movement" of American public opinion for a US-Soviet rapprochement and by making overtures for such. US intentions are blackened if it fails to respond



to this "movement" and to these overtures, and Soviet standing gains accordingly.

The above conclusions need to be considered in detail in view of their broader implication for Soviet foreign policy. The following points are pertinent:

(a) While Moscow propaganda has always portrayed American public opinion as opposed to official foreign policies, it seems likely that the Soviet leadership truly reached this conclusion following the November congressional elections. Both Mikoyan and Khrushchev made statements to that effect in speeches shortly after the elections.

(b) However, the idea of this "growing trend" in American public opinion was not developed in any extensive form in the Soviet press until the latter half of December, after the Mikoyan trip was arranged but before the trip took place. Pravda, on December 19, belatedly published in full two articles from the Detroit press of November 25 reporting on a speech by US industrialist Cyrus Eaton calling for a US-Soviet rapprochement. More important, Soviet writer Il'ya Ehrenburg published an article in the December 30 issue of Sovetskaya Rossiya which was an elaborate and original presentation of the theme that a "turning point" had been reached in American public opinion in favor of seeking better relations with the USSR.<sup>1</sup>

(c) At his January 24 press conference on his return to Moscow, Mikoyan presented the same thesis, namely, that "increasing numbers of Americans" wish improved Soviet-American relations but that their views "have not yet found expression in any practical steps by the US Government." (See Section E below.)

(d) Mikoyan presented initially the same picture in his speech to the 21st Party Congress, devoted mainly to a report on his trip. To be sure, Mikoyan gave a more positive appraisal of his talks with US officials: at his Moscow press conference he asserted that US officials "showed a certain reserve and one could not feel they desired to move toward achieving agreement on most important problems," while in his Congress speech he stated that these leaders "in contrast to earlier times, expressed a readiness to negotiate disputed issues." However, Mikoyan entered the same caveat that "practical steps," or "deeds," should follow "words," placed the burden for ending the cold war on US leaders, and criticized Secretary Dulles and others for making statements in a cold war spirit and allegedly in contradiction to their assurances to him. (See Section E.)

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1. See IIBs No. 67, January 8, 1959 and No. 75, January 28, 1959 for a more detailed analysis of this article.

(e) The Soviet position on substantive issues pronounced by Khrushchev and others at the 21st Party Congress indicated no intention to deviate from various "hardline" tactics which have come to the fore in Soviet foreign policies during the past year, but, on the contrary, guaranteed their continuance for some time to come by endorsing them at the highest (in the formal sense) party gathering.

From this, it seems fair to conclude that: (1) the recent Soviet gestures and appeals for a US-Soviet rapprochement raised in connection with the Mikoyan visit do not signify a reversal of the more demanding, militant Soviet policies of the past year, but are more limited in their objective; (2) Mikoyan's appraisal of the results of his trip seemed to be based on predetermined conclusions, although it is quite possible that the trip actually reinforced and amplified these conclusions; (3) Moscow probably hoped to place US "cold war strategists" on the defensive by stimulating a campaign for a US-Soviet rapprochement. As noted above, if Soviet appeals for such met a favorable response from the American public this would generate pressure for accommodation to certain Soviet demands. And if, in any event, the "cold war strategists" failed to respond to these Soviet overtures, or, as Mikoyan put it, failed to answer words with deeds, then Moscow would be in a better position to accuse US leaders of lack of good faith and to discredit their policies. (This, however, should not be taken to mean that Mikoyan's restrained criticism and generally favorable assessment of his trip are devoid of any positive significance). (See Section E).

3. Other Reasons. The Soviet leaders probably had several other considerations in mind in arranging Mikoyan's visit. By appealing for an improvement of East-West relations, Moscow hopes at a minimum to emphasize the "peacefulness" of Soviet policies and, in the present instance, may hope to cloak its Berlin proposal in a more peaceful light, and ease the way for negotiations on this and related issues. On the domestic Soviet scene, the Mikoyan visit enables Khrushchev to present a trophy of "success" of his policy of "peace" to the current Party Congress and to the Soviet public at large.

There is another possible explanation of the Mikoyan trip, namely, that it is related to possible differences within the Kremlin leadership on foreign policy issues. According to this hypothesis, Mikoyan came to the US (1) to resolve differences within the Kremlin on the proper course to follow in regard to Berlin, based on varying estimates of the West's intention (with Mikoyan favoring a go-slow approach), or (2) to build a case for a renewed, concentrated drive for an East-West detente, in opposition to those in the Kremlin favoring a generally harder line. The proceedings of the Party Congress do not bear out the latter point (which, of course, is contrary to the general line of analysis presented above) but there is some inconclusive evidence tending to support the first point.

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- 5 -

C . Mikoyan's Position on Substantive Issues

With the exception of the proposal for a conference on a German peace treaty (which merely anticipated the Soviet note of January 10), Mikoyan did not introduce any essential modification of the Soviet position on outstanding international issues. However, he did indicate several interesting, but relatively minor changes and threw some light on Soviet thinking by emphasizing certain problems and particular aspects of these problems.

The following analysis is based for the most part on Mikoyan's talks with US officials. His public statements and off-the-record remarks at unofficial gatherings and private talks were usually couched in general terms. A few such statements have been included below where they departed significantly from or added noteworthy detail to Mikoyan's statements to US officials.

1. Berlin. Mikoyan introduced several modifications, but no basic change, in the Soviet position on Berlin, namely: (1) In his January 5 aide-memoire, Mikoyan indicated that East and West Germany should join the four former occupying powers in talks on Berlin's status (this point was not clear in the Soviet November 27 note). However, he did not reiterate this point in his talks with US officials. (2) In the aide-memoire and in official talks, Mikoyan suggested that, if the West desired, a "permanent international commission" apparently composed of the four former occupying powers and the "two" German states (he was not precise in spelling the composition or functions) could be established to supervise guarantees of a "free city" status for West Berlin. He also repeated, in this connection, the earlier Soviet suggestion that the UN could be given a role in guaranteeing West Berlin's "free city" status. (3) Following the visit, at his January 24 press conference in Moscow, Mikoyan indicated that the USSR would delay taking action on the turnover of functions in Berlin for "two or three weeks or even for two or three months" beyond the six months' deadline if talks were then in progress on Berlin's status and "if we are convinced of good will on the part of the Western powers to negotiate with the object of ending the occupation regime in Berlin."

Throughout his private and public remarks, Mikoyan stressed that the USSR sought no advantage from the Berlin situation and was not confronting the West with an ultimatum. His efforts to play down the ultimative aspects of the Soviet "free city" proposal were noticeable from the very

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881137-158

- 6 -

start; the January 5 aide-memoire, in discussing the "free city" proposal, failed to mention the possibility of unilateral Soviet action in ending Berlin's occupation status. At one point he told Secretary Dulles that if "nothing happened in six months" the USSR would turn over its powers respecting Berlin to the GDR. But even this implied that if talks were under way at that time the USSR might delay action. On the other hand, Mikoyan also stated that six months was a long enough period in which to complete negotiations on Berlin, insisted that the "free city" scheme could not be extended to East Berlin, and said that the Soviets would be "compelled to fulfill their commitment if nothing changed about Berlin."

While Mikoyan repeatedly called for Western counterproposals, he made clear that such counterproposals should be limited to "corrections and amendments" of the Soviet "free city" proposal and suggested no quid pro quo for the abandonment of the USSR's declared intentions in regard to Berlin. Although he denied that the USSR threatened military action, he attached "certain generals" for statements concerning the use of tanks "to break through to Berlin" and contended that tanks of one side would be met by the tanks of the other side.

Comment:

In accentuating the positive and playing down the ultimate aspects of the Soviet proposals on Berlin, Mikoyan's purposes seemed to be to depict these proposals as "reasonable" and to induce the West to engage in negotiations on them. Regarding the latter point, this is apparently a calculated response to the West's refusal to discuss Berlin's status and other related issues under the shadow of a Soviet ultimatum. It does not appear to indicate any lessening of the Soviet intention to carry out the transfer of functions. The hint about extending talks beyond the deadline significantly was limited to talks on Berlin on Soviet terms. On the other hand, Mikoyan indicated (albeit ambiguously) in his Party Congress speech that he was impressed with the US determination to remain in Berlin; if this is true, it could affect Soviet tactics on Berlin. There has, however, been no indications of this as yet.

During his first talk with the Secretary, Mikoyan asserted without apparent amplification that "no one was asking for withdrawal" of troops from Berlin, that "the Soviets were proposing the termination of the occupation, not the withdrawal of forces." If this statement was not a rhetorical sleight-of-hand (which it probably was), it would imply Soviet willingness to permit Allied troops to remain in West Berlin after its establishment as a "free city." This, of course, would be completely contrary to the Soviet demand that West Berlin be demilitarized.

881137 - 159

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- 7 -

2. Germany. (See also sections on Berlin, European Security, and Eastern Europe.) The principal "new" proposal presented by Mikoyan was that for a conference in "approximately two months" to consider a German peace treaty. This proposal, made in the meeting with the Secretary on January 5, was subsequently elaborated on in the Soviet notes and draft peace treaty of January 10 (see IR-7924). Apart from various more or less minor innovations in the proposed treaty, the chief novelty in these proposals was the suggestion that Moscow would be prepared to negotiate on a peace treaty in conjunction with the Berlin issue rather than exclusively on the latter as demanded previously. But Mikoyan made clear (and Khrushchev has since confirmed) that the USSR would still refuse to negotiate on the question of German unification. He repeatedly urged that "confederation" (which to the President he described as a "coalition government"), agreed upon by the Germans themselves, was the only realistic way to unification. He stated in one conversation that the USSR was not opposed to a united Germany even though it recognized that the communists would be in a minority. Khrushchev made a similar point to Ambassador Kroll on February 2.

At the same time, his references to the preservation of the "social system" of the GDR served to show that "confederation" is not, in fact, regarded by the USSR as leading to unification. An indication that the USSR may take further steps to solidify the division of Germany came in Mikoyan's remark to the President to the effect that if Adenauer continued to block a peace treaty and the US supported him, the USSR and the other Eastern European countries might have to find their own "independent way" to a solution. This warning has since been echoed by Gromyko in his speech to the 21st Party Congress and by Khrushchev in his talk with German Ambassador Kroll (February 2) in which he mentioned a separate peace treaty.

Another somewhat unusual point which Mikoyan raised concerned West German recognition of Poland and Czechoslovakia. He complained that while Adenauer had assured him last year that recognition would take place, it had not in fact occurred. This complaint was only one aspect of Mikoyan's sustained public and private attacks on Adenauer as the source of trouble regarding Germany. Defense Minister Strauss ran Adenauer a close second in these attacks. As expected, Mikoyan gave especial emphasis to the danger of the Federal Republic's acquiring nuclear weapons. He accused Adenauer of wishing to "engulf" the GDR and liquidate the socialist regime there. He explained in at least one talk that Soviet concern with German acquisition of nuclear weapons was not due to fear of Germany as such but rather to concern that a strongly-armed Germany could involve both the US and the USSR in devastating war.

Comment. The emphasis which Mikoyan placed on Germany, and the amount of time he spent talking about it suggest that at least one purpose of his mission was to put the US under pressure to be more receptive to Soviet proposals on the German problem.

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881137-160

In response to a question from the Vice President, he singled out Germany as the most important problem between the US and the USSR. In his public remarks, and also in several private ones, he clearly sought to make Adenauer the culprit for current tensions and the deadlock in Germany. He may believe that his line here was at least partly the cause of reported US efforts to induce Adenauer to show greater flexibility. In his Moscow press conference he described as "very interesting" the Secretary's comment that free elections were not the only way to unification, and he may feel that his efforts here produced this comment.

While Mikoyan spent most of his time propounding the "realism" and reasonableness" of the Soviet position in hopes, perhaps of thereby promoting some sort of international conference, he also used the pressure device of threatening an "independent solution" in case the West refuses to change its position. He did not spell out the nature of such a solution but his reference was apparently to some scheme for a separate Soviet peace treaty with the GDR. That this may be the Soviet plan was confirmed in Khrushchev's remarks to Ambassador Kroll on February 2.

3. European Security. In his conversations with US officials, Mikoyan had nothing novel to say on the subject of European security. Indeed, his remarks were almost entirely within the context of the Soviet proposals regarding Berlin and a German peace treaty. However, Mikoyan did deal with this subject at length (in the context of alleged Soviet terms for a German settlement) in a private conversation with "a prominent student of foreign affairs." (The individual was so described by the agency preparing the report.) This conversation deserves some attention because Mikoyan is reported to have made statements considerably at variance with his statements to US officials.

Mikoyan is quoted as indicating that a "united Germany" would have to recognize formally the borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia. (The Soviet peace treaty draft contains such a provision for a confederate Germany and/or for the separate German states.) Further there would be an atom-free zone in Central Europe including "United Germany." (Presumably this would include also Poland and Czechoslovakia, as proposed by Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki.) Inspection would be under the United Nations, with Russians and Americans participating.

In addition, Mikoyan was reported as granting that a "United Germany" might remain in NATO but that in this case there would have to be a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression pact. (Moscow has long proposed such a non-aggression pact under conditions in which Germany would remain divided.)

Mikoyan is quoted as suggesting foreign troop cuts in Germany by absolute figures rather than by percentages as Moscow is currently proposing. It is not clear whether the context here was a "United Germany" or a divided Germany, i.e. the present situation.

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- 9 -

Finally, he talked of "an inspection zone" including Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, "part of France" and "some of Russia, but not much." Again, it was not clear whether this zone would come into being as part of an arrangement to unite Germany or under presently existing conditions. (Moscow has, since November 1956, proposed a European inspection zone, roughly of the size indicated above, as a means of preventing a surprise attack.) The inspectors would apparently include both Americans and Russians.

Comment: The real crux of all the above is Mikoyan's supposed acquiescence in a "United Germany" as part of NATO. Mikoyan's reported quid pro quo of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact contradicts repeated Soviet assertions that the USSR does not need "paper guarantees" in the event a united Germany were part of NATO, since it can look after itself, as well as repeated Soviet statements that the inclusion of Germany within NATO is unacceptable. The standard Soviet non-aggression pact proposal actually refers to a situation in which Germany is either divided, as now, or "confederated" (i.e. in fact still divided) or united but not in NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Since Mikoyan did not make a similar proposal in any other conversation and in view of the background set forth above, it is highly unlikely that Mikoyan's reported remarks had serious intent. The other facets of Mikoyan's reported position on European security correspond roughly to existing Soviet views, though because of the rather vague report of the conversation precise comparisons cannot be made and seeming departures should not be overvalued.

One other point is of some interest: this was the suggestion for foreign troop cuts in Germany by absolute figures rather than percentages. This might possibly point to a change in Soviet proposals for a one-third cut, though it must be noted that the latter reduction was mentioned in the Soviet peace treaty draft which was sent to the US on January 10, four days after the conversation under discussion here. Mikoyan was reported to have told members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the USSR could accept one-third reductions of foreign forces in European countries. If so, he made no essentially new proposal since the USSR has, since November 1956, suggested "considerable" foreign troop reductions in Europe. Moscow's Geneva proposals of November 28, 1956 also mentioned one-third foreign troop cuts in the European inspection zone suggested by the USSR. Meanwhile, Khrushchev, in his 21st Congress speech, reiterated the standard Soviet position on complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Europe: any Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe must be matched by withdrawal of Western foreign forces from Western Europe plus the liquidation of all foreign bases.

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881137-162

4. Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests. There were no essentially new points in Mikoyan's statements on the current Geneva negotiations on discontinuance of nuclear tests. He said on several occasions in public and private that agreement on this issue was one of the first things to be achieved in improving US-Soviet relations and that it would be the test whether there could be agreement on other topics. In private talks he sought explicit confirmation that the US was interested in an agreement. As to specific matters under dispute in Geneva, Mikoyan significantly stated that the "main problem" was the question of voting procedure in the proposed Control Commission. He asserted that the USSR could not agree to a majority voting system in the control organization which would enforce a test ban since the US would always have a majority and could thus dictate to the USSR. When it was pointed out to Mikoyan that the Soviet delegate had offered to produce a list of matters on which there had to be unanimity in the control setup (i.e. on which a veto would operate), Mikoyan agreed that such a list might help resolve the current impasse. The list has since been submitted but scarcely helped resolve the impasse. He showed some flexibility on the question of the duration of a treaty, stating that a compromise could probably be found on the US-UK "year-by-year" formula. The Soviet delegate in Geneva is still insisting on "a ban for all time."

Mikoyan maintained the standard Soviet position that it was impossible to conceal nuclear explosions and that any US assertions regarding the difficulty of detection were artificial roadblocks to an agreement. He did make the new point that if the USSR turned out to have more advanced detection devices than the US, these would be made available once an agreement on a test ban had been reached.

Comment: Mikoyan's statements suggest that for their own reason the Soviets remain interested in a test ban but are probably prepared to accept only the type of controls over which they maintained a substantial veto.

5. UN Committee on Outer Space. Mikoyan clearly stated the USSR's intention to continue to refuse to participate in the UN Committee on Outer Space as presently composed. The formation of the committee, according to Mikoyan, was an example of US attempts to place the USSR in an inferior position in the UN. In view of the USSR's prowess in this field it was unfair to put the USSR and its allies in a small minority to be permanently outvoted by Latin Americans and others who had little to contribute in the field of space research. The USSR would like to participate in the committee, however, and would do so if there were equality between the positions in the committee of the US and the USSR, the only two nations with space capabilities.

Comment: This represents no change from the established Soviet position. Mikoyan did not seem to be aware of the fact that part of the



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- 11 -

difficulty over membership arose from the Soviet delegation's desire to pick specific members from among the Latin Americans instead of those the Latin Americans themselves put forward.

6. Other Disarmament Issues. Apart from his remarks on the nuclear test question and on outer space, Mikoyan had almost nothing to say on disarmament matters. He made no response to the Secretary's discussion of the US position in the experts talks on reducing the danger of surprise attack, although in a couple of his public appearances Mikoyan cited the surprise attack problem as a matter that should be negotiated and complained about the US attitude at Geneva. In one conversation, Mikoyan indicated concern with the "fourth country" problem and asserted that "if France gets nuclear weapons other countries will get them." The context, however, was the cessation of nuclear weapons rather than the prohibition of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes (which has been the US proposal for coping with the "fourth country" problem.)

Comment: Mikoyan's treatment of disarmament (i.e. his emphasis on the nuclear test question and occasional references to surprise attack) indicates continued Soviet stress on these two subjects, at least for the moment, and rather less interest in pressing for other types of disarmament measures.

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881137-164

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- 12 -

7. Trade. Mikoyan's talks with American officials revealed no changes in the Soviet position on trade with the United States.

In the most important official conversations on economic matters, a talk with Under Secretary Dillon on January 19 and a talk with Secretary of Commerce Strauss on the same day, Mikoyan made no proposals for the increased Soviet purchase of American consumer goods or other items not restricted for export to communist bloc countries and reiterated Soviet requests made in Khrushchev's letter of June 2, 1958, including the granting of long-term credits. Furthermore he made it plain that he expected US concessions on such issues as the reduction or removal of export controls, the granting of most-favored-nation treatment, and the repeal of legislative restrictions on the import of furs and crabmeat. Mikoyan was acidly frank in his expression of annoyance and disappointment at the failure of the US Government to make what he called "positive and constructive suggestions" (e.g., granting of credits) for the expansion of Soviet-US trade. The over-all tone of his conversation with both Mr. Dillon (and to a lesser extent in his conversation with Admiral Strauss) was sharp and, at times on Mikoyan's part, querulous and sarcastic. He challenged the validity of the US claim for repayment of lend-lease debts (although this had previously been acknowledged by both sides), denied that Soviet trade is sometimes manipulated for political purposes, and suggested that the executive branch of the US Government should recommend to Congress that legislative restrictions on trade with the USSR and other communist countries be repealed. He also accused the State and Commerce Departments of obstructing the conclusion of deals for the Soviet import of US petro-chemicals and equipment, despite the fact that, as he alleged, American firms were prepared and willing to fill Soviet requests.

As Mikoyan's tour of the United States progressed, it became increasingly evident that he was going out of his way to cultivate cordial relations with American business and financial leaders. In New York, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago and San Francisco Mikoyan adopted a reasonable, let's-be-businesslike attitude on trade, portraying himself as an intelligent, aggressive hard-headed businessman ("Gentlemen, we wish to sell our products for the highest possible price and buy as cheaply as possible") and generally "making good sense" in his discussion of Soviet foreign trade objectives. Included in this approach was a subtle exploitation of the traditional distrust and dislike of American business for governmental controls and bureaucracy. This exploitation ranged from the simple statement of regret that, although both US firms and Soviet organizations wanted to do business, deals were held up by inactivity and negative attitudes in Washington, to the allegation (untrue) that even chewing gum, firewood, and laxatives are prohibited for export from the US to the USSR.

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881137-165

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- 13 -

The alleged split between US business and government circles on the issue of trade was repeatedly emphasized in Soviet official and press comment after Mikoyan's visit to the US had been concluded. Mikoyan himself summarized the current Soviet view at a press conference in Moscow on January 27, immediately after his return from the United States. In a formal statement and in answer to a correspondent's question he claimed that although he had found US business circles and the American people generally receptive to expanded commercial relations with the USSR, the Department of State and other branches of the US Government apparently wish to continue the cold war. He concluded that apparently nothing could be done to change this position and that it would be necessary to "wait for better times."

Comment. The over-all Soviet attitude on the US-USSR trade issue now appears to be one of exasperated resignation and that nothing can now be done to change the anachronistic and negative US official position which must eventually and inevitably yield to the pressure of modern times.

Mikoyan's sharp reaction in his conversation with Under Secretary Dillon seems to have been due to the fact that he was genuinely hurt and surprised not to have found any American proposals for modifications of administrative and legislative restrictions on Soviet trade. It is possible that he expected that his "courting" of American business circles would already have had some effect in causing a shift in the US position. Mikoyan's reactions also reflected the strong Soviet sensitivity to US discrimination against the USSR through such measures as prohibition of imports of Soviet crab meat and certain furs, and abolition of most-favored-nation treatment for Soviet exports. In his speech before the 21st Party Congress on January 31, Mikoyan emphasized again the Soviet desire to conclude a trade agreement with the US and singled out the repeal of "discriminative" US tariffs on Soviet products and the granting of most-favored-nation treatment to the USSR as important steps in normalizing US-Soviet trade. He did not mention the question of strategic trade controls, other than to state that the Soviet Union was interested only in "peacetime commodities."

8. Propaganda. A verbal, implicit agreement by Mikoyan to review, on the basis of reciprocity, Soviet propaganda attacks on the US was the only concrete result of his official talks. In his conversation with Mikoyan the Vice President urged that both sides show restraint in their propaganda output and furthermore that leaders of both countries should refrain from making provocative public statements. Agreeing with this, Mikoyan said that such statements were very dangerous and that perhaps a new approach should be made. He maintained, however, that the US was the

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881137-166

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- 14 -

worse offender in making provocative statements. In response to a suggestion from Secretary Dulles during their January 16 meeting, Mikoyan indicated that he would review the Soviet propaganda line, on a basis of reciprocity, to see if it could be improved in any respect.

Mikoyan maintained that the USSR's jamming of VOA broadcasts was due to their objectionable contents. However, he admitted that he was not familiar with the contents of recent VOA broadcasts beamed to the USSR and was noncommittal when Ambassador Thompson suggested that Soviet Government examine these broadcasts and inform the US about objectional statements. Mikoyan denied the existence of inflammatory anti-US Soviet propaganda, especially directed at Latin America, and at one point claimed the Soviet radio broadcasts could not even reach Latin America.

Comment. Unsufficient time has passed to evaluate the significance of Mikoyan's apparent offer to tone down Soviet propaganda attacks on the US and its leaders. However, Mikoyan seemed to have taken account of this in the two public statements which he has made after his return to Moscow. At his January 24 press conference, he gave an affirmative answer to a question, apparently "planted", by a Soviet journalist, as to whether he considered it possible that the press of both sides "refrain from making sharp statements." This "agreement" probably was also behind Mikoyan's unusually mild criticism of US leaders in his Party Congress speech. This does not mean, however, that the Soviet leadership would not seek to turn such an "agreement" to their advantage. Such an endeavor was apparent in Mikoyan's statement to the Party Congress that the US leaders were not observing their private assurances to him that they had no intention of "intervening" in the internal affairs of Eastern European countries.

9. Peaceful Coexistence, International Contacts, and a Summit Conference. Mikoyan's remarks on the first subject were typified by his statement to Vice President Nixon that the USSR did not want war but peaceful co-existence, not because it was weak or cowardly but because the Soviet people wanted to develop their country and make it rich like the US. In this connection Mikoyan said that in recent months our relations had improved and that the Soviet leaders now had more "confidence" in the US leaders, although it was still far from full confidence. The recent series of conversations with prominent Americans such as Stevenson, Lippmann, Johnston, and Senator Humphrey had made a real impression on the Soviet leaders and convinced them that something must underlie the Americans' statements. The Vice President's statement in London had also been something unusual, Mikoyan said.

He spoke in general terms of the desirability of more discussions between American and Soviet officials but did not specifically press for

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881137-167

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- 15 -

a summit conference. The subject of a summit conference was in fact not mentioned at all in private conversations with US officials, although Mikoyan did invite Vice President Nixon to visit the USSR. When questioned publicly on the subject, Mikoyan indicated that the USSR remains in favor of a summit conference but did not give the impression that the USSR expected one in the near future.

While Mikoyan privately as well as publicly called for increased US-Soviet contacts "at all levels," he spoke only in generalities and had no particular suggestions on what sort of contacts or how they were to be brought about.

Comment. The theme that the USSR wants peace, but not because it is weak, was repeatedly emphasized in public and private. A novel element is the admission that as a result of recent contacts the Soviet leaders now have a better opinion of their American counterparts. Mikoyan did not give the impression that if negotiations on the Berlin crisis were to occur he expected them to be on the summit level.

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881137-168

10. International Communism. When tackled on the subject of international communism, Mikoyan denied that the USSR dictated to foreign communist parties or attempted to subvert foreign states. Although the USSR's sympathies were naturally on the side of the Communists everywhere, he said, the USSR did not help foreign Communist parties come to power; the manner in which they did so must be determined by the conditions in their own countries. Why should Americans be so fearful about Communists, he asked, when there were so few in the US? He cited the USSR's good relations with the UAR, which suppresses Communists, as proof of his thesis. The USSR did give advice, based on its longer experience, to other countries of the Soviet bloc, Mikoyan admitted, but he cited examples to show that such advice was not always taken.

Comment. This is the standard Soviet line, and is of course refuted by Mikoyan's own discussion of the Soviet intervention in the Hungarian revolt. The statement that other Soviet-bloc countries did not always take Soviet advice is novel, but it was made only in a private conversation and the examples cited are of slight importance.

11. Cultural Relations. Mikoyan made several general statements, both private and public, in favor of increased US-Soviet cultural exchanges but he did not appear particularly interested in raising this question in official talks. In a response to a statement by President Eisenhower that the idea of cultural exchanges had not been implemented as it should be, that for example, not 20 or 30 students but hundreds should be exchanged, Mikoyan replied that some practical steps in this field had already been taken, that neither side had reason to be disappointed as reciprocity had been observed and both sides had been "correct". He agreed that there should be "several hundred" students exchanged but "frankly" acknowledged that the USSR wanted to start with a smaller number because it suspected that there might be US intelligence agents among the students. He added that the outcome of the student exchange program would depend on the "behavior" of the students, i.e., on whether or not they engaged in "Intelligence" activities.

Comment. Mikoyan thereby implied that the American students now in the USSR are being carefully watched for evidence of any activities improper from the Soviet point of view and that an expansion of the program will depend on the absence of such activities. It is improbable that the USSR will actually agree to an exchange program of "several hundred" students, not so much because of possible espionage activities but because this would greatly expand young Soviet intellectuals' exposure to "unhealthy" influences. (See also position on "Propaganda".)

12. Eastern Europe. Mikoyan did not raise the question of alleged interference in Eastern Europe, but the question came up in discussions on Hungary and East Germany. It was apparent from Mikoyan's remarks that this issue as well as the question of Western recognition of the

status quo in Eastern Europe was very much on his mind. During a discussion on Hungary with Vice President Nixon, Mikoyan stated that the USSR thought the US was trying to divide and break up the Soviet bloc. On Hungary itself, Mikoyan in his conversations with US officials did not try to draw the analogy between Hungary and Lebanon that he did in his public appearances. Instead, he depicted the Soviet intervention as forced on the USSR by the realities of power politics. The Soviet leaders, according to Mikoyan, thought that a threat to a friend and ally was a threat to the USSR so they had reluctantly been forced to act. He asserted that the US would not have stood aside if a communist government or other government hostile to the US had come to power in Canada or Mexico. While indicating that the USSR still believed that US intelligence had played a role in the revolt, he did not press the point and conceded that the main cause of the revolt was the mistaken policy of the Hungarian leaders.

On East Germany, Mikoyan repeatedly charged in his officials talks that "Adenauer" had designs of "engulfing" or "annexing" East Germany by means of subversion, military power and "mechanical" annexation. He criticized the West for ignoring the existence of a "second" German state. However, he asserted that another revolt would not occur in East Germany and that East Germany was constantly improving its economic regime (due to the fact that the Soviets had stopped taking reparations and were now covering all occupation expenses).

In his talk with the President, Mikoyan expressed his "gratification" at the Secretary's remarks to the effect that it was not United States policy to act against the Soviet Union and that the United States had no desire for violent action with respect to East Germany. (In his January 16 talk with Mikoyan, the Secretary had denied that the US had attempted to incite turmoil in East Germany and had stressed that, on the contrary, the US did not like to see any trouble there since this would be dangerous for us all.) Later, in his speech to the 21st Party Congress, Mikoyan publicly expressed himself favorably regarding assurances by the Secretary and the Vice President that the US did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Eastern European countries and further noted the absence of references to "containment," "roll-back" and "liberation" in statements made to him by US leaders.

**Comment:** Mikoyan's remarks clearly demonstrated the USSR's continued concern over the stability of its Eastern European empire and continued efforts to help consolidate its hold by gaining Western acceptance of the "status quo" there. Mikoyan's purposes in making the above statement to the Party Congress would seem to be to establish the claim that he had obtained recognition by US leaders of the "status quo" and, to lay the basis for subsequent allegations, when US leaders criticize Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, that the latter violated assurances made to Mikoyan.

Mikoyan's statements on Hungary deviate somewhat from the USSR's public position, which has been to emphasize alleged American involvement. However, there is no real change in the Soviet position that the intervention was justified and would be repeated if the same circumstances arose again. Mikoyan merely tried to make this position seem more reasonable to the US.

13. Soviet Equality. Mikoyan did not raise the subject of "parity" as an independent issue. However, this Soviet demand was a major feature of Mikoyan's presentation of the Soviet positions on discontinuance of nuclear testing and the UN committee on outer space (see above). In discussing these and other topics, Mikoyan repeatedly stated that the USSR is not to be talked to in the language of "Diktat," that its permanent presence on the international scene must be accepted, and that the USSR must be considered the equal of the US in international relations.

Comment: This is further evidence of the importance which Moscow attaches to Western recognition of the legitimacy and "rightful" claims of the USSR and the Soviet bloc as a whole.



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- 12 -

14. Middle East. Mikoyan's statements regarding the Middle East did not break any basically new ground. Like Bulganin and Khrushchev in Pritinin in 1956, he readily recognized the importance of the Middle East to Europe as a source of oil and as a means of communication with Asia. He added some clarification to past Soviet proposals regarding an arms embargo for the "Near and Middle East" by suggesting that this area the USSR has in mind does not extend as far as Morocco but rather centers on the "Arab world," Iran and Turkey.

Mikoyan evinced particular concern over the establishment of US bases in "countries like Iran and Turkey." He expressed disapproval of the Baghdad Pact, asserted that the USSR never interferes in the internal affairs of the countries of the area (specifically Iraq), and, like current Soviet policy, voiced displeasure at Iran's "providing" of military bases to the US. He was adamant in maintaining that the US desired to keep up tension in the area and was responsible for the large military establishments of the countries there, and suggested that any understanding between the US and the USSR regarding the Middle East depended on the ending of "US interference." Mikoyan sought to make the argument that the US would be better off, especially in its relations with countries which are not parties to the Baghdad Pact and to agreements involving the US, if such pacts and agreements were scrapped.

Comment. Mikoyan's statements reflected the long-standing Soviet objective of removing US military presence from the area and of preventing additional US military commitments there. His main targets were Turkey and Iran. He indicated that as long as US military-political ties with these two countries remained close their relations with the USSR would be strained. He made no new substantive proposals or suggestions and he singled out for explicit mention from among past Soviet proposals only that for an arms embargo.

15. China. In conversations with US officials, Mikoyan denied that there was any analogy between China and the other divided countries; Germany and Korea had been divided into zones of occupation by the victorious allies and the division of Viet Nam was the result of agreement reached at Geneva by all concerned, while the division of China resulted from the unilateral interference of the US in Chinese affairs. The USSR, he claimed, was surprised at China's patience with the US over the Taiwan issue. If the US withdrew from Taiwan it would still have other bases in the Western Pacific, from which the USSR and China had not demanded that the US withdraw, although they did not like them. If the US objected to withdrawing under pressure, it had best get out now voluntarily before it was forced out. A disarmament agreement, Mikoyan said in answer to a question at the January 5 dinner, should include China since China did not now possess nuclear weapons and an agreement would check the expansion of the possession of weapons, which was desirable.

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881137-172

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- 20 -

Comment. The only significant new element here is the semi-public admission that the USSR does not want China to have nuclear weapons and that this is one reason why it wants a disarmament agreement. His reference to other American bases in the Pacific is also novel, but is apparently only a talking point intended as a sop to his listeners.

16. Air Incidents. When the September 2 crash of the US C-130 in Soviet Armenia was brought up in private conversations with US officials, Mikoyan firmly maintained that the USSR knew nothing of the missing 11 men, and also denied that the plane had been shot down. He conceded that such incidents were regrettable, but said that the way to avoid them was for American planes to use safer routes. He did not, however, repeat Khrushchev's assertion, in his conversation with Eric Johnston, that the USSR would continue to shoot down foreign planes on its borders.

Comment. There was no apparent change from the established Soviet position. The fact that Mikoyan did not repeat Khrushchev's threat does not mean, of course, that the policy announced by Khrushchev has been changed.

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881137-173

D. Major Themes of Mikoyan's Public Statements in the United States

The themes which were especially emphasized by Mikoyan in his prepared public statements in the United States were as follows:

(1) The USSR wants peace, but not because of weakness. Its strength is shown by its recent scientific achievements.

(2) One reason why the USSR desires peace is that it must devote all its efforts to fulfilling its seven year plan and a foreign threat would reduce the effort it could devote to the plan. The magnitude of this plan is the best guarantee of the USSR's desire for peace.

(3) The US is responsible for the cold war, but the USSR wishes to let bygones be bygones and make a fresh start in the development of friendly US-Soviet relations.

(4) The USSR's move on Berlin was by no means an ultimatum. The USSR is willing to listen to any reasonable proposals on Berlin, but has heard none from the US so far. Peace urgently demands a solution to the German problem. The USSR is concerned at the possibility of West Germany being armed with nuclear weapons and considers the present West German leadership to be belligerent.

(5) The experiences of his trip have lead Mikoyan to believe that all classes of American society, ordinary people and leading business men, want peace and good US-Soviet relations, but this desire has not been reflected in the actions and policies of the US Government. The American people realize the devastation that would result from a new war.

(6) As one means of developing good relations, the USSR wishes increased trade between the US and USSR. The US strategic trade controls are ridiculous and have hurt the US rather than the USSR.

(7) The USSR also wishes increased contacts "on all levels" between Americans and Soviets.

(8) Disarmament is an urgent problem in view of the terrible effects of nuclear weapons, against which there is no defense. (See also Annex 3 for a compilation of Mikoyan's public statements on significant themes.)

E. Probable Impact on Mikoyan and Soviet Leadership

1. Mikoyan's Political Personality. The impact which the trip made on Mikoyan, and hence on the Soviet Leadership, is perhaps the most difficult and most important question to answer.

By way of introduction, it should be noted that among the Soviet leaders Mikoyan probably appreciates most the Soviet Government's need for a more objective knowledge of the outside world and perhaps is most inclined to modify existing Soviet doctrine and thinking to conform closer to reality. He has been one of the leading proponents in the Soviet leadership of expanded cultural and economic ties with the West and may well be mainly responsible for these and other related features of post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy. This is indicated both by his public statements (cf. his speech to the 20th Party Congress) and by his private remarks. To cite a minor but appropriate example, in a conversation with Ambassador Bohlen not long before the 20th Congress, Mikoyan admitted, after a chiding from Bohlen (who cited the number of US study centers on Soviet affairs) that Soviet universities and research institutes devoted too little attention to developments in the West. It is probably no coincidence that, at the 20th Party Congress, Mikoyan sharply criticized the quality and quantity of studies by Soviet economists and others of the "contemporary stage of capitalism" and noted that there are more than 15 institutes in the US studying the Soviet economy.

In brief, from the point of view of relative objectivity, open-mindedness, and ability to compare (Mikoyan, of course, visited the US previously in 1936), Mikoyan was the most suitable of the Soviet leaders to undertake a fact-finding mission to the US. Indeed, Mikoyan might be inclined to exaggerate in his private reports to the leadership some observations made during his trip in order to buttress his apparent conviction that a flexible, "peaceful coexistence" foreign policy is the best possible for the Soviet Union.

2. US Wealth and Strength. To begin with the easiest question to answer, there seems to be little doubt that Mikoyan was impressed with the wealth and economic strength of the US. This impression came through in both his public statements and private remarks, although the former were qualified by the caveats that America "could do even better under socialism" and "America's economy did not suffer during the war" so as not to give the devil more than his due. For example, Mikoyan noted in his speech before the National Press Club on January 19 that "there has been a great deal of new construction [in the U.S.] -- roads, plants, factories. Compared with 22 years ago you have also grown richer. Fortunately during the last war there were no weapons used as potent as those at present and whereas we suffered great damage you suffered none." Perhaps the more revealing remark in this regard was made by Mikoyan's private secretary, V. Smolyanichenko.

When asked in Los Angeles about his general impressions of the US, Smolyanichenko replied in effect that "we" had expected to find many fine laboratories, many automobiles and well-dressed people, etc., but "we" were surprised to find so much of everything. The listener had the impression that Smolyanichenko was speaking for Mikoyan as well as for himself. It has also been reported by several journalists that Mikoyan was impressed by the fact that factories he visited were operating at full capacity.

Assuming that the above conclusion -- that America's wealth and strength produced a strong impact on Mikoyan -- is correct, this can be expected to have several desirable results. There is no doubt that one of the purposes of Mikoyan's trip was to serve as "eyes" for Khrushchev, and that Mikoyan wields considerable influence in his own right. As one intangible result of Mikoyan's observations, the Soviet leadership might be more inclined to take into account the realities of America's economic strength. For example, the Soviet leaders might be less inclined to count on a major depression in the US as a means for advancing the communist cause in the free world. Mikoyan made only a few passing remarks concerning the 1958 recession in the US and might well have been impressed with the resilience of the American economy in overcoming this recession. If so, this reinforced rather than changed Mikoyan's previous beliefs, as he has on earlier occasions shown a more realistic understanding of this question than is true of most Soviet leaders. (For example, in his 20th Congress speech he strongly criticized Stalin's thesis that the division of the world market resulting from the creation of the Soviet bloc would bring about an absolute decline in the industrial production of the US, the UK, and France.) In any event, this would probably have a salutary effect on the thinking of the Soviet leadership.

New York Times correspondent Harrison Salisbury has reported that Mikoyan's trip seems likely to produce a shake-up in Soviet diplomatic and news reporting because of the sharp contrast between the real America and the America the Soviet press has been describing. According to Salisbury, Mikoyan while in Washington ordered the Soviet Embassy to send up-to-date reports on a number of aspects of American life and TASS correspondents in the US have been enjoined to improve their reporting. It is not known at present whether Salisbury's report is accurate, but a scrutiny of outgoing TASS dispatches might provide an answer in the near future.

3. Statements in Moscow. At his Moscow press conference on January 24, Mikoyan summed up his "general impressions" on his visit in the following words:

"The conviction is being formed that, despite manifestations of the cold war and existence of such prejudice in the United States, on the whole the atmosphere is now favorable for steps toward strengthening peace. Increasing numbers of Americans are starting to realize that war and the threat of war are, in present conditions, an altogether unsuitable method of solving international problems, that relations between states, and especially with the Soviet Union and other socialist states, cannot nowadays be based

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- 84 -

on them. The American people want peace. This cannot but make us rejoice. It strengthens our confidence that joint efforts of the USSR and the United States together with other states, must create conditions for a peaceful and calm life."

Mikoyan prefaced these remarks with the assertion that "American political leaders, too, as distinct from the recent past, have expressed themselves in favor of improving Soviet-American relations," although "these views by US political leaders have not yet found expression in any practical steps by the US Government." Commenting on his talks with US officials, Mikoyan stated that the "US side showed a certain reserve and one could not feel that they desired to move toward achieving agreement on most important problems." However, Mikoyan expressed his "sincere gratitude" to President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, Secretary Dulles, and other US officials for their "cordial hospitality" and promised reciprocity to Americans visiting the USSR.

The same general tone appeared in his speech to the 21st Party Congress. However, Mikoyan gave a more positive appraisal of his talks with US leaders and introduced an additional note of hurt surprise that public statements of US leaders after his trip were allegedly not in accordance with their private assurances to him.

Summing up his impression of the visit, Mikoyan said: "As for what impressed me most in the United States, I should say it was the fact that both ordinary Americans and the businessmen I talked with looked on me as an emissary of the Soviet Union, although I was there unofficially. Their attitude was very friendly." He went on to expatiate on the friendliness of his reception and the desire of Americans for a better understanding between the US and USSR, and said: "We sensed the longing for peace of the American people and most businessmen. We could see that they are fed up with the cold war and want real peace on this earth and good peaceful relations between the Soviet Union and the United States."

His talks with US Government leaders were "frank and very proper," Mikoyan said, and showed a desire on both sides to understand each other. Summarizing the matters discussed, Mikoyan stated:

"The US leaders also said that their policy on Berlin and a peace treaty with Germany was bipartisan and that we should not expect it to change if the Democrats came to power, and they asked me to convey this fact to the Soviet Government and Comrade Khrushchev. I may add here that Mr. Harriman, too,...remarked to me during a conversation at his home, in the presence of a small group of New York captains of industry on whose behalf he was speaking, as he said, that all of them -- and there were people from both parties there -- fully supported the present US position on Berlin and disarmament."

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881137-177

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-25 -

He said, however, that "I no longer heard the US side talking of containing, repelling, or liberating," and drew this conclusion:

"We may conclude from these statements of the President and Secretary of States that now they are inclined to recognize the principle of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social and political systems. If that is the case, it is very significant for peace. But these statements must be followed by action to bear them out, and we have every right to expect such action....In contrast to earlier times, the US statesmen expressed a readiness to negotiate disputed issues."

Mikoyan went on to complain, though without the usual Soviet invective, that the US political leaders had made public statements since his visit not in accordance with their private assurances to him, and in effect, accused them of attempting to undo the good effects of his visit. He asserted that although the "cold war has already thawed considerably" among the American people,...the prongs of the cold war strategists are still so strong that we must not commit ourselves to any far reaching conclusion concerning retreat of the part of American circles interested in fanning the cold war." After asserting that Secretary Dulles' farewell telegram to Mikoyan "would seem to place a heavy responsibility on the American side to strive for rapprochement between our countries," Mikoyan voiced his "surprise" that the Secretary had stated in a press conference that the USSR did not want the cold war to end. This led Mikoyan to inquire plaintively: "What is Dulles after?"

Mentioning the Vice President's speech at Fordham, Mikoyan said:

"Speaking to me, Nixon said that he thought it important that the statements made on both sides at government level should be distinguished by moderation and objectivity....Nixon supported the principles of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states. It is to be regretted that Nixon considered it possible in his speech to interfere most unceremoniously in the domestic affairs of the European countries of peoples democracy, although it must be noted that when speaking to me Nixon and other statesmen declared that they did not want to interfere in these countries' domestic affairs."

Recalling his "explanations" of international communism, he said: "It appeared at the time that both Nixon and Dulles understood our position, but now they are again taking their stands on this issue as though no explanation had been given." Mikoyan concluded with an aggrieved discussion of US uncooperativeness on the trade issue. \*

\* See IIB No. 78 for a detailed analysis of Mikoyan's speech.

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881137-178

4. General Impression of Reception. These remarks serve as an introduction to the consideration of three questions: How did Mikoyan react in general to his reception in the United States? Does he believe in his own thesis that the American people increasingly favor a rapprochement with the Soviet Union and oppose the administration's foreign policies? What was his reaction to the official US position on outstanding issues?

There is no reason to doubt that Mikoyan was favorably impressed by the general friendliness and cordiality of his reception, by the public and officials alike. On at least one occasion (in San Francisco) he showed some nervousness about the activities of Hungarian refugee demonstrators, but he kept his composure and, as on other occasions, expressed no ill-will concerning the demonstrators' activities. He had probably been forewarned by the Soviet Embassy about protest demonstrations and may have expected worse.

Only on three occasions did he openly express any irritation. Following his January 6 luncheon with labor leaders, he remarked several times that US labor leaders were less friendly toward the USSR than the "capitalists;" and indeed, the labor leaders were far more pointed and acute in their remarks and questions than the businessmen Mikoyan met. Mikoyan also engaged in some sharp exchanges during his talk with Under Secretary of State Dillon and following the meeting stated angrily to the press that he had the impression "that the cold war in the State Department is continuing." And during his appearance at the National Press Club, Mikoyan engaged in a mild diatribe against the "ungentlemanly" conduct of NBC newsmen Lawrence E. Spivak on the "Meet the Press" television program the preceding evening.

5. American Public Opinion. As noted above, Mikoyan's thesis of a growing trend in American public opinion toward improving relations with the USSR was fully anticipated by Ehrenburg's December 30 article and in all probability Mikoyan's thesis was as much a continuation of a predetermined line as a conclusion drawn from his trip. Indeed, in statements during the trip, Mikoyan deliberately called attention to alleged differences on this matter between the American people and the government. This, however, does not mean that this line does not accurately reflect a Soviet estimate or that Mikoyan's views on this subject were not reinforced by his observations in the United States. The contrary may well be true. Mikoyan was probably impressed by the constant affirmation of the US's desire for peace which he encountered throughout his trip. In encounters with private citizens, Mikoyan also frequently heard the desire expressed for improved US-Soviet relations, for the expansion of trade between the two countries, etc. On the other hand, while the US officials receiving Mikoyan spoke in equally unequivocal terms about their desire for peace and for efforts to remove existing differences where possible, they certainly gave Mikoyan no grounds to believe that a major shift in US policy toward the USSR was in the making. These two facts, plus the possible element of wishful thinking and the Soviet leaders' own peculiar understanding of "good relations" and "peace," may have led Mikoyan



to believe (or more likely reinforced his previous belief) that there is a trend in US public opinion favoring an improvement in relations with the USSR and opposing, in general, current US policies.

However, so far as is known, Mikoyan encountered a solid wall of support for the US position on the Berlin issue and opposition to the Soviet "free city" proposal among the private citizens and political leaders outside the executive branch of the government with whom he talked. That this made an impression on Mikoyan is indicated by his gratuitous statements on this subject to the Party Congress. From all of the above observations, it seems possible that Mikoyan concluded that aggressive, assertive actions by the Soviet Union threatening what the US generally considers as its legitimate interests tend to solidify American opinion and that broad, generalized appeals for US-Soviet collaboration are most likely to stimulate division of opinion in the US. This conclusion seems all the more likely in view of Mikoyan's own apparent proclivity for the "soft" approach in pressing for Soviet objectives.

6. Official US Views. Mikoyan probably received a mixed impression of the US position on Berlin and Germany; of determination not to be forced out of Berlin but of willingness to negotiate, at least on the general subject of Germany. This is indicated both by the presentation of the US position during official talks and by several subsequent remarks by Mikoyan. For example, while it was obviously Mikoyan's tactic from the very beginning to play down the ultimative aspect of the Soviet initiative on Berlin (in order to induce the West into negotiations on Berlin's status), Mikoyan in several public statements seemed to assume defensive attitude in protesting that the Soviet position was "misunderstood" and that no ultimatum was intended.

More significant, his statement to the Party Congress that "US leaders" has assured him of bipartisan support for the US position on Berlin and a German peace treaty, "that they asked me to convey this fact to the Soviet Government and Comrade Khrushchev," seems to be a somewhat unnecessary and gratuitous public admission from the Soviet point of view. This statement would seem to indicate that Mikoyan, at a minimum, was impressed with the US's determination, both official and public, to maintain its position in Berlin. It may also have been intended as a warning to elements in the Soviet leadership who might favor a more impetuous course in regard to the Berlin situation. It may also have been intended to create an impression of US acquiescence in the "status quo" -- Soviet style -- in Eastern Europe or, in the case of contradictory public statements by US officials, to accuse the latter of bad faith.

On negotiations, Mikoyan stated at his Moscow press conference that "I also became convinced that the US ruling circles act as they please and do not want to negotiate" the "free city" proposal. However, he told the Party Congress that "in contrast to earlier times, the US statesmen expressed

a readiness to negotiate disputed issues." And at his Moscow press conference, Mikoyan suggested the possibility of a change in the US position on Germany. He termed Secretary Dulles' statement that "free elections were not the only way to German unification" as "a very interesting statement" and indicated that he thought the US would be willing to discuss the "confederation" scheme. And during one of his talks with Secretary Dulles, Mikoyan expressed interest in the Secretary's statement on German election.

In both official talks and public statements, Mikoyan was visibly annoyed at the US position on trade relations. This may have been feigned for effect, but more likely than not it was real. As the ultimate authority on Soviet trade policies, Mikoyan's prestige was probably involved in this matter. He may have also overestimated the effect of "demands" from businessmen for the removal of trade restrictions.

Both publicly and privately Mikoyan criticized the overall US position on East-West issues as inflexible. However, as noted above, Mikoyan asserted in his speech to the Party Congress that "in contrast to earlier times, the US statesmen expressed a readiness to negotiate disputed issues," gave a generally positive appraisal of his talks with US leaders and criticized Vice President Nixon and Secretary Dulles for making subsequent public statements allegedly not in accordance with their assurances to him. It is concluded above (Section B) that one purpose of the Mikoyan trip was to place US foreign policy on the defensive by developing the theme that a growing number of Americans favor a US-Soviet rapprochement, that the USSR desires such a rapprochement, but that the US "cold war strategists" block such a rapprochement. Further, the conciliatory line taken by Mikoyan in his Party Congress speech supports this endeavor (even though it plays down the theme of a gap between the American people and their government) as it places the "responsibility" for ending the cold war on the shoulders of US leaders.

Nevertheless, it would probably be a mistake to judge Mikoyan's true appraisal of his official talks and his impressions of US leaders as entirely negative. For example, he readily seconded Secretary Dulles' remarks that official US-Soviet contacts were useful in that they at least helped to dispel imagined differences. And his reaction to remarks by Vice President Nixon and Secretary Dulles on the ill effects of propaganda attacks was seen in his apparent agreement to tone down Soviet propaganda on a basis of reciprocity. This "agreement" was reflected in Mikoyan's positive appraisal of such arrangement in his Moscow press conference and in his mild criticism of US leaders in his Party Congress speech. This does not mean, however, that the Soviet leadership would not seek to turn this to their advantage. Such an endeavor was apparent in Mikoyan's statement to the Party Congress that US leaders were not observing their private assurances to him that they had no intention of "intervening" in the internal affairs of Eastern European countries. This is clearly another gambit in the USSR's continuing drive to gain Western recognition of the status quo -- Soviet style -- in Eastern Europe.

## F. Probable Impact on the Soviet Public

The image of the visit received by the average Soviet citizen will, of course, be affected by the way the Soviet press reported it. While covering the trip in some detail, although virtually without editorial comment, the Soviet press made some significant omissions and distortions. There was no mention, for example, of the unfriendly demonstrations by Hungarian refugees. The Soviet accounts of Mikoyan's question-and-answer sessions omitted some of the questions on sensitive subjects and Mikoyan's answers to them. Mikoyan's apparent deviations from communist dogma are actually less heterodox than may appear at first blush, but even so, they were not reported. The comparison between the interventions in Hungary and in Lebanon, the position of Jews in the USSR, the missing 11 American airmen, the possibility that the USSR may be partly responsible for the cold war, -- all these were taboo subjects for the Soviet reader. Mikoyan's utterances of "sweet reasonableness" were reproduced at length, however, and an impression was left that they were generally approved by his listeners. The prominence of these listeners, at the various lunches and dinners given for Mikoyan, was emphasized. The cordiality of his reception at these affairs was reported and possibly somewhat exaggerated.

The significant omissions in Soviet press coverage of Mikoyan's statements are of things he said in reply to questions or "off the cuff" in informal conversations. His prepared public statements were reported in fairly detailed and reasonably accurate summary. (See Section D above for a list of the main themes of these statements.) The actual events of the trip -- where he went and when, whom he spoke with, etc. -- were reported with meticulous detail with one noteworthy exception: there is no mention of his meeting with Herbert Lehman and other prominent American Jews who questioned him about the position of Jews in the USSR.

The Soviet reader will certainly gain the impression, from the emphasis on the warmth of Mikoyan's reception, that he has won friends and influenced people in the US. In view of the Soviet public's longing for peace, for "relaxation of tensions," and for increased contacts with foreign countries, the regime's initiative in sending Mikoyan to the US and the skillfulness of his performance here are likely to increase the prestige and popularity of the present Soviet leadership. The average Soviet citizen may be encouraged in the belief that his government is doing all possible for peace.

G. Probable Impact on American Public Opinion \*

The chief conclusions which arise from analysis of the voluminous press and radio-TV comment on Mr. Mikoyan's visit may be stated as follows.

(1) The Mikoyan visit disappointed both the extreme hopes and extreme fears which were expressed in advance: hopes that the visit might hasten some significant agreement on problems causing serious world tension, and fears that Americans would be "seduced" by clever propaganda.

(2) Many commentators feel that it was invaluable for Mr. Mikoyan to gain a truer impression of the strength and firmness of America. Some thought it salutary for Americans to gain a more vivid impression of the character and attitudes of Soviet leaders.

(3) To the extent that the visit may have been designed to pressure the United States Government to change its substantive position on Berlin--or on trade with the USSR -- it was a failure.

(4) The visit probably did intensify the pre-existing current of American opinion calling on the Government for a greater show of "flexibility" -- i.e., willingness to participate in talks and to make counter-proposals which might ease the tensions over Berlin.

(5) Secretary Dulles' press conference remarks about free elections with reference to the unification of Germany were:

- (a) welcomed by a considerable number of prominent commentators as a show of greater US "flexibility";
- (b) sharply deplored by "nationalist" spokesmen--and some others --as unwise concessions to Soviet pressure;
- (c) accepted by others as constituting no change in fundamental US policy. Some of these thought Mr. Dulles' "reasonableness" may have been helpful.

(6) In general, "nationalist" spokesmen fear that the USSR has gained through "backtracking" in US policy on Germany. Recent critics of US policy think the visit may have occasioned greater US willingness to advance counter-proposals in expected negotiations. Most think both countries may have gained clearer impressions of the other.

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\*This section is an extract from a document, dated January 28, 1959, prepared by the Public Studies Division.

Annox 1

## ITINERARY OF MIKOYAN IN THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 4-20, 1959\*

Sunday, January 4, 1959

5:15 a.m. Arrives Idlewild Airport, New York City.  
5:40 a.m. Departs New York City by Soviet Embassy automobile.  
7:30 a.m. Visits Howard Johnson's Restaurant on New Jersey Turnpike..  
9:15 a.m. Visits Motel at Perryville, Maryland.  
11:20 a.m. Arrives Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C.  
2:35 p.m. Walks around downtown Washington.  
4:00 p.m. Returns to Soviet Embassy.

Monday, January 5, 1959

11:50 a.m. Leaves Soviet Embassy.  
12 Noon Meeting with Secretary Dulles, Department of State.  
3:15 p.m. Walks around Rock Creek Park and Connecticut Avenue in vicinity of Dupont Circle.  
8:00 p.m. Attends dinner Motion Picture Association, 16th and I Streets, N.W.

Tuesday, January 6, 1959

10:25 a.m. Departs Soviet Embassy.  
10:45 a.m. Visits supermarket - White Oaks, Maryland.  
12:40 p.m. Returns to Soviet Embassy.  
1:00 p.m. Lunch at CIO/AFL headquarters on 16th Street, N.W.  
3:10 p.m. Returns to Soviet Embassy.

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\*This is based on a memorandum of January 26, 1959 prepared by SX/P.

4:15 p.m. Departs Soviet Embassy.  
4:30 p.m. Meeting with Vice President Nixon at Capitol (2½ hours).  
7:00 p.m. Returns to Soviet Embassy.

Wednesday, January 7, 1959

7:30 a.m. Departs Soviet Embassy.  
8:00 a.m. Departs Washington, D.C. via Capital Air Lines.  
10:10 a.m. Arrives Hopkins Airport, Cleveland, Ohio.  
Met by Mr. Cyrus Eaton.  
10:15 a.m. Holds press conference at airport.  
11:45 a.m. Arrives Hotel Cleveland.  
12 Noon Meets with Officials of the C&O Railroad.  
12:25 p.m. Departs Hotel Cleveland.  
12:30 p.m. Lunch at the Union Club.  
2:40 p.m. Departs Union Club.  
3:00 p.m. Visits Lincoln Electric Company.  
4:30 p.m. Arrives Cyrus Eaton's farm.  
7:00 p.m. Dinner at Cyrus Eaton's farm.  
9:15 p.m. Leaves Cyrus Eaton's farm.  
9:45 p.m. Arrives Hotel Cleveland.

Thursday, January 8, 1959

8:15 a.m. Departs Hotel Cleveland.  
9:10 a.m. Arrives Cleveland Airport.  
9:20 a.m. Leaves Cleveland Airport via Capital Air Lines.  
10:05 a.m. Arrives Willow Run Airport, Detroit.

10:10 a.m. Press Conference, Detroit Airport.  
 11:00 a.m. Arrives Engineering Building, Ford Motor Company.  
 11:15 a.m. Arrives River Rouge Plant, Ford Motor Company.  
 12:40 p.m. Lunch in Administration Building, Ford Motor Company.  
 3:00 p.m. Departs Ford Motor Company.  
 3:30 p.m. Arrives General Motors Corporation.  
 Tour of the Engineering Center and ride in Firebird II.  
 4:15 p.m. Leaves General Motors Corporation.  
 4:35 p.m. Arrives Chrysler Motor Engine Plant.  
 4:50 p.m. Departs Chrysler Motor Engine Plant.  
 5:15 p.m. Arrives Fort Shelby Hotel.  
 7:30 p.m. Leaves Fort Shelby Hotel.  
 7:35 p.m. Arrives Detroit Club.  
 10:20 p.m. Departs Detroit Club.  
 10:25 p.m. Arrives Fort Shelby Hotel.

Friday, January 9, 1959

8:00 a.m. Press Conference, Fort Shelby Hotel.  
 8:30 a.m. Leaves Fort Shelby Hotel.  
 9:05 a.m. Arrives Edison Power Plant.  
 10:00 a.m. Departs Edison Power Plant.  
 10:25 a.m. Arrives Willow Run Airport.  
 10:55 a.m. EST Leaves Detroit via Capital Air Lines.  
 10:50 a.m. CST Arrives Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois.  
 11:00 a.m. CST Departs Midway Airport.  
 11:25 a.m. CST Arrives Conrad Hilton Hotel.

11:30 a.m. Press conference, Conrad Hilton Hotel.  
 11:55 a.m. Arrives suite in Conrad Hilton Hotel.  
 12:35 p.m. Departs Conrad Hilton Hotel.  
 12:35 p.m. Arrives Chicago Club (Luncheon given by Mr. Anderson).  
 2:30 p.m. Departs Chicago Club.  
 2:45 p.m. Arrives Merchandise Mart.  
 3:45 p.m. Departs Merchandise Mart.  
 4:00 p.m. Arrives home of Joseph Polowsky, 4126 Sheridan Road.  
 4:20 p.m. Departs home of Joseph Polowsky.  
 4:35 p.m. Arrives Conrad Hilton Hotel.  
 5:45 p.m. Departs Conrad Hilton Hotel.  
 5:55 p.m. Arrives Midway Club (Bar Association Dinner - Adlai Stevenson, host).  
 8:40 p.m. Departs Midway Club.  
 8:50 p.m. Arrives Opera House for Baryzka dance troupe performance. Goes backstage to greet performers.  
 11:05 p.m. Departs Opera House.  
 11:15 p.m. Arrives Conrad Hilton Hotel.

Saturday, January 10, 1959

10:30 a.m. Departs Conrad Hilton Hotel.  
 11:10 a.m. Arrives Midway Airport.  
 12 Noon Airborne for San Francisco via United Air Lines.  
 4:50 p.m. Arrives International Terminal - San Francisco.  
 4:55 p.m. Departs San Francisco - International Terminal.  
 5:20 p.m. Arrives Hotel Mark Hopkins.  
 5:50 p.m. Leaves Hotel Mark Hopkins.



6:00 p.m. Arrives 555 Post Street for Press conference.  
7:05 p.m. Departs 555 Post Street.  
7:15 p.m. Arrives Hotel Mark Hopkins.  
7:35 p.m. Departs Hotel Mark Hopkins.  
7:40 p.m. Arrives Fairmont Hotel (World Trade Association dinner).  
10:40 p.m. Leaves Fairmont Hotel.  
10:45 p.m. Arrives Hotel Mark Hopkins.

Sunday, January 11, 1959

10:10 a.m. Departs Hotel Mark Hopkins for sightseeing trip around San Francisco. Visits Twin Peaks, Golden Gate Park, Fishermen's Wharf, Opera House, Inspiration Point.  
11:00 a.m. Call on Governor Brown in the State Building.  
11:40 a.m. Departs Governor Brown's Office continuing sightseeing with a stop at the home of Captain Quinlan of the San Francisco Police Department to see his home and eight children.  
12:55 p.m. Arrives Hotel Mark Hopkins.  
1:00 p.m. Private Luncheon, Hotel Mark Hopkins.  
1:50 p.m. Departs Hotel Mark Hopkins.  
2:30 p.m. Arrives San Francisco International Airport.  
2:40 p.m. Airborne for Los Angeles via United Air Lines.  
5:10 p.m. Arrives Burbank Airport, Los Angeles.  
5:15 p.m. Departs Burbank Airport.  
5:40 p.m. Arrives Hotel Ambassador.  
6:10 p.m. Press Conference, Hotel Ambassador.  
6:40 p.m. Leaves Hotel Ambassador.  
7:05 p.m. Arrives Beverly Hills Hotel (Eric Johnston's dinner).

10:40 p.m. Leaves Beverly Hills Hotel.

11:00 p.m. Arrives Hotel Ambassador.

Monday, January 12, 1959

12:45 a.m. Walk in the gardens of the Hotel Ambassador.

1:30 a.m. Return to suite.

7:30 a.m. Leaves Hotel Ambassador.

10:00 a.m. Arrives UCLA. Tours campus and meets graduate students and professors.

11:20 a.m. Departs UCLA.

12:15 p.m. Arrives Perino's Restaurant for World Affairs Council luncheon.

2:15 p.m. Departs Perino's Restaurant.

2:40 p.m. Arrives Paramount Studios and visits sets. Attends tea given by Frank Freeman.

4:20 p.m. Leaves Paramount Studios.

4:45 p.m. Arrives Hotel Ambassador.

7:00 p.m. Private dinner in suite in Hotel Ambassador.

8:05 p.m. Departs Hotel Ambassador.

8:30 p.m. Arrives KTTV (Television program with Paul Coates).

9:20 p.m. Departs KTTV.

9:40 p.m. Arrives Hotel Ambassador.

11:15 p.m. Walk in the garden of the Hotel Ambassador.

11:50 p.m. Returns to suite.

Tuesday, January 13, 1959

8:05 a.m. Departs Hotel Ambassador.  
8:35 a.m. Arrives Los Angeles International Airport.  
9:28 a.m. PST Leaves Los Angeles International Airport via United Air Lines.  
8:05 p.m. EST Arrives Idlewild Airport, New York City.  
8:15 p.m. Leaves Idlewild Airport, New York City.  
8:45 p.m. Arrives 680 Park Avenue (office of Soviet Mission to UN).

Wednesday, January 14, 1959

8:45 a.m. Leaves 680 Park Avenue.  
9:00 a.m. Arrives Macy's Department Store.  
10:15 a.m. Leaves Macy's Department Store.  
10:40 a.m. Arrives 680 Park Avenue.  
12 noon Leaves 680 Park Avenue.  
12:35 p.m. Arrives First National Bank Building for luncheon.  
2:00 p.m. Leaves First National Bank Building.  
2:50 p.m. Arrives 680 Park Avenue.  
3:50 p.m. Leaves 680 Park Avenue.  
4:00 p.m. Visits Governor Harriman, 16 East 81st Street.  
5:30 p.m. Leaves Governor Harriman's residence.  
5:50 p.m. Arrives Hotel Waldorf Astoria.  
6:00 p.m. Poses for pictures, meets hotel guests.  
7:00 p.m. Dinner in the main ballroom of the Waldorf Astoria (approximately 1,000 guests).  
10:35 p.m. Departs Waldorf Astoria.  
10:50 p.m. Arrives 680 Park Avenue.

Thursday, January 15, 1959

10:40 a.m. Leaves 680 Park Avenue.  
11:00 a.m. Arrives UN Building -  $\frac{1}{2}$  hour with Secretary General,  
 $\frac{2}{3}$  hour inspection of building and  $\frac{1}{2}$  hour press conference.  
12:35 p.m. Departs UN Building.  
12:55 p.m. Arrives Carlisle Hotel, 77th and Madison Avenue.  
2:30 p.m. Leaves Carlisle Hotel.  
2:40 p.m. Arrives 680 Park Avenue.  
5:10 p.m. Leaves 680 Park Avenue.  
5:15 p.m. Arrives Council on Foreign Relations.  
6:25 p.m. Leaves Council on Foreign Relations.  
6:30 p.m. Arrives 680 Park Avenue.  
8:00 p.m. Leaves 680 Park Avenue.  
8:05 p.m. Arrives Carlisle Hotel (Dinner given by Donald David).  
10:25 p.m. Leaves Carlisle Hotel.  
10:45 p.m. Arrives Pennsylvania Station, New York City.  
12:18 a.m. Leaves Pennsylvania Station, New York City.

Friday, January 16, 1959

6:10 a.m. Arrives Union Station, Washington, D.C.  
7:20 a.m. Leaves Union Station, Washington, D.C.  
7:40 a.m. Arrives Soviet Embassy.  
10:15 a.m. Leaves Soviet Embassy.  
10:30 a.m. Arrives State Department for meeting with Secretary Dulles.  
12:45 p.m. Leaves State Department.

1:00 p.m. Arrives U.S. Capitol (Luncheon given by Senator Greene).  
2:45 p.m. Leaves U.S. Capitol.  
3:00 p.m. Arrives Soviet Embassy.  
3:50 p.m. Leaves Soviet Embassy.  
4:00 p.m. Arrives Department of State for meeting with Secretary Dulles.  
5:15 p.m. Leaves State Department.  
5:25 p.m. Arrives Soviet Embassy.  
7:55 p.m. Leaves Soviet Embassy.  
8:00 p.m. Arrives 1925 F Street, N.W. (Dinner given by Secretary Dulles).  
10:40 p.m. Leaves 1925 F Street, N.W.  
10:50 p.m. Arrives Soviet Embassy.

Saturday, January 17, 1959

8:55 a.m. Leaves Soviet Embassy.  
9:00 a.m. Arrives White House.  
10:45 a.m. Leaves White House.  
10:55 a.m. Arrives Soviet Embassy.  
12 Noon Leaves Soviet Embassy.  
12:15 p.m. Arrives Rock Creek Park - Walks around the Park.  
12:55 p.m. Leaves Rock Creek Park.  
1:10 p.m. Arrives Soviet Embassy.  
5:15 p.m. Leaves Soviet Embassy. Walks on 17th, K, 14th, F, 13th, G, 14th, L, 16th Streets with a stop in Garfinkel's Department Store.  
6:25 p.m. Arrives Soviet Embassy.

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- 40 -

Sunday, January 18, 1959

11:18 a.m. Leaves Soviet Embassy. Walks around N.W. Washington in the vicinity of 30th and Nottingham Streets, Rock Creek Park and the Zoo. Visits the homes of Mrs. Keenan - 2823 North Hampton and Doctor Conely - 2808 North Hampton.

2:05 p.m. Arrives Soviet Embassy.

5:20 p.m. Leaves Soviet Embassy.

5:40 p.m. Arrives NBC Studios - 4001 Nebraska Avenue for "Meet the Press."

7:20 p.m. Leaves NBC Studios.

7:35 p.m. Arrives Soviet Embassy.

9:00 p.m. Leaves Soviet Embassy.

9:05 p.m. Arrives Motion Picture Association, 16th and I Streets.

11:45 p.m. Leaves Motion Picture Association.

11:50 p.m. Arrives Soviet Embassy.

Monday, January 19, 1959

9:50 a.m. Leaves Soviet Embassy.

10:00 a.m. Meets with Under Secretary Dillon at Department of State.

11:50 a.m. Leaves Department of State.

12 Noon Arrives National Press Club.

2:20 p.m. Leaves National Press Club.

2:35 p.m. Arrives Soviet Embassy.

2:50 p.m. Leaves Soviet Embassy.

3:00 p.m. Arrives Department of Commerce. Meeting with Secretary Strauss.

4:10 p.m. Leaves Department of Commerce.

4:15 p.m. Arrives Soviet Embassy.

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5:10 p.m. Leaves Soviet Embassy.  
5:20 p.m. Arrives PEPCO. Met by Mr. Goldman and Mr. Lacke.  
Visits lunch room and inspects Macke automatic snack-bar  
(vending machines).  
5:40 p.m. Leaves PEPCO.  
5:50 p.m. Arrives Soviet Embassy.  
6:00 p.m. Reception in honor of Mr. Mikoyan at Soviet Embassy.  
8:00 p.m.

Tuesday, January 20, 1959

9:20 a.m. Arrives Union Station, Washington, D.C.  
9:35 a.m. Leaves Washington, D.C. via Pennsylvania Railroad.  
1:40 p.m. Arrives Pennsylvania Railroad Station, New York City.  
1:45 p.m. Leaves Pennsylvania Railroad Station for Idlewild Airport.  
2:40 p.m. Arrives Idlewild Airport.  
3:43 p.m. Airborne from Idlewild.

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- 12 -

Annex E

COLLECTION OF MIKOYAN'S PUBLISHED STATEMENTS IN THE US

Cold War

"All of the toughness of the cold war has not crowded /probably/ mistranslation for 'hardened'/the hearts of the American people. The reception we got from the workers was most cordial." (United Press International - Chicago, January 9, 1959)

"The first thing to do is to insure peace. We should try to get closer together. We should put an end to the cold war." (San Francisco, Associated Press, January 10, 1959)

"We /he and American political leaders/ did not try for any agreements. But we found often that our arguments were met with understanding and I am ready to accept some of their arguments. Of course, the cold war remains a cold war, but people more and more are anxious to bring it to an end." (New York Times, January 10, 1959)

"I would like to impress you with the fact that if you want good relations with us, we won't accept dictation. At one time we were weak. But no one can force us to our knees now. Perhaps we have less knowledge and less capital -- but we have will power. Let us speak as equal to equal."

"We do not want to make war, but neither do we want to capitulate." (Associated Press, Chicago, January 10, 1959)

"We should put an end to the cold war...start talking together as human beings, on the basis of equality. The language of dictation should not be used to us or any other nation." (Washington Post and Times Herald, January 11, 1959)

"I think you were not quite correct in saying that I said the Soviet Union was at fault as far as the cold war is concerned." (New York Times, January 19, 1959, from "Meet the Press" transcript)

"The USSR and the United States/ must try to remove all this nonsense which is barring the way to understanding." (New York Times, January 11, 1959)

"We have made some mistakes of act and policy." (New York Times, January 9, 1959, James Reston)

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Berlin

(When asked if the Kremlin had changed its attitude on Berlin)  
 "Why change? One does not change a good position." (Special New York Times,  
 Washington, January 6, 1959)

(When asked: Why is West Berlin such a threat to Russia?)  
 "East Germany has a lower standard of living than West Germany due to greater war damages; West Berlin's greater progress was due to a great deal of American capital piped in. The West would not let Russia take reparations from West Germany so had to take them from East Germany. Until recently East Germany had to pay 100 percent of the Soviet occupation costs though they were reduced to 50 percent and now will all be paid by Russia."

"Why can't East and West set up a confederation of the two Germanies as a reasonable step toward unification and why can't the two Germanies sign a peace treaty?" (Washington Post and Times Herald, January 7, 1959, Chalmers M. Roberts paraphrasing)

"Why can the United States not understand that the Soviet Union cannot be indifferent to the rearmament of the Germans?" (New York Times, January 9, 1959, James Reston)

"I do not think that our policy on Berlin would have been changed. It is a good position. We would like to raise the general question of a peace treaty with Germany. We have one purpose -- to liquidate the remnants of the past war and make the position of Europe more secure." (New York Times, January 10, 1959)

(When asked: Would Soviet Russia accept United Nations administration of Berlin as a free city?) "Yes, in part."

(When asked: What guarantees would there be for Western access to a free city of Berlin, and how would these be given?) All obviously the interested governments, including that of Eastern Germany, would make the guarantees, and then all would be responsible for seeing that these were honored. (New York Times, January 9, 1959)

(When asked: Now that the West has rejected Soviet proposals for making West Berlin a free city, will you shorten the six months period before you turn East Berlin over to the East Germans?) Russians stick to their word and six months remains of the period. But the West has not rejected the Soviet note; rather it has proposed negotiations, adding some points. Our position on Berlin has been frequently misrepresented. Some say the Russians want to drive the Allies out to gain advantage. We do not want that. But West Berlin is being maintained on the bayonets of occupation troops. We want a free city with its own police as a guarantee of its sovereignty and of free access.

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- 44 -

(When asked: What about a United Nations status for Berlin?) The US might take some part; that is a matter for discussion. But the West has made no proposals; only repeated former proposals. (Washington Post and Times Herald, January 7, 1959, Chalmers H. Roberts paraphrasing)

"As far as we are concerned, we do not want a war over Berlin, but it depends on the other side to keep the peace." (United Press International, Los Angeles, January 13, 1959)

#### Anti-Party Group

"They are removed but they hold other positions -- less important positions, not policy-making ones any more. But some hold other positions tantamount to ministers or heads of large trusts and Mr. Molotov is an Ambassador, a very important position." (New York Times, January 10, 1959)

"We consider him (Mr. Molotov) a good capable and honest man out he is a conservative who does not recognize the need for changes. He got so used to red tape he couldn't see how one could do without it." (Associated Press, San Francisco, January 10, 1959)

"Mr. Molotov might even become an ambassador to a larger state."

"He /Mr. Molotov/ is now ambassador to Mongolia. I have full confidence in him in whatever state he represents us. It's just that the questions of reforms will not come up again for him to judge." (New York Times, January 11, 1959)

"I knew Beria well and I did not respect him. He was an adventurer... an intriguer, a man without principle... a sort of businessman in politics." (Washington Post and Times Herald, January 10, 1959)

(Not direct quotes) Indicated that Lazar Kaganovich is now director of the asbestos industry in the Urals. D. Shepilov is director of the Institute of Economics in Kirgizia. (Washington Post and Times Herald, January 11, 1959)

#### United Nations Committee on Outer Space

"But when that committee on this matter was set up, the spirit of diktat (dictation) and of military blocs seems to have prevailed. There was an attempt to place the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in a subordinate position.... Out of eighteen members twelve are participants in military blocs -- NATO, SEATO, and the like -- people who speak and vote at the behest of their blocs. Neutral countries, nonmembers of blocs, were given three seats. The Socialist countries were also given three seats. You will surely understand that this was an attempt to mock justice and to disregard the true requirements of the study and exploration of outer space." (New York Times, January 16, 1959)

UNCLASSIFIED

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Jewish Problem in USSR

"There is no Jewish problem in the Soviet Union at all. This problem is created by those who wish to impede good relations." (New York Times, January 16, 1959)

Algeria

"Our position on Algeria is well known. A just war is being waged by the Algerian people. It is a war for independence and liberation from the colonial yoke. All the freedom-loving peoples of the world have sympathy for the Algerians." (New York Times, January 16, 1959)

China

"Soviet Union's relations with Communist China are good and getting better every day....When the Chinese ask it, we help them in a comradely way on a basis of equality, it is our duty and the Chinese appreciate it."

"This (Chinese system of communes) shows that other Communist countries do not automatically copy the Soviet Union." (Washington Post and Times Herald, January 11, 1959)

Summit Meeting

(When asked: Why do you want a summit conference without an agenda?) There is value in meetings but Russia is puzzled by those here who ask whether there is any point in talking to the Soviet Union. And words like rollback and liberation are bad.

(What would a summit meeting consider?) It might consider Berlin, German reunification, European security, all Western proposals, and the Rapacki plan for an atom-free zone and also the control of arms in the two Germanies, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in order to abolish atomic weapons in all of Germany. Also reducing foreign troops by one-third as a starter. (Washington Post and Times Herald, January 7, 1959, Chalmers H. Roberts paraphrasing)

Peaceful Competition

"It might seem that contacts between people are a minor matter....I would say that these contacts have brought about warmer winds in our cold war relations....Let us compete in having more milk and more meat and more clothing for people. And we hope you won't complain if we do catch up with you." (Washington Post and Times Herald, January 7, 1959)

"Mr. Nixon repeated what he said in his London speech calling for competition in the economic field, competition in the improvement in the

welfare of our peoples rather than in the military field. You probably know that when the Vice President expressed his idea, Mr. Khrushchev supported the idea and welcomed the statement. Today I lend my full support to that idea." (Baltimore Sun, January 6, 1959, after seeing Nixon)

#### Hungary

On the Hungarian uprising, Mikoyan said that the thing that worries him was that too many Americans think that the Russians enjoy shooting people.

The Russians, he said, came to the assistance of a lawful government just as the United States did in Lebanon last year. (Washington Post and Times Herald, January 9, 1959, reporting on the Detroit visit)

#### Responsibility for the Cold War

"We say you are wrong. You say that we are wrong. Solomon would probably decide to split the blame down the middle." (New York Times, January 9, 1959, reporting on the Detroit visit)

#### German Rearmament

"Do you know what it means to put atomic weapons in the hands of German revenge seekers?" he asked. "You are arming Germans with atomic weapons to be used against us and you are demanding free elections. The one is not compatible with the other." (Washington Post and Times Herald, January 13, 1959, reporting on the Los Angeles visit)

#### Foreign Aid

"We were very pleased that you suggested that we try to combat poverty together," Mikoyan said to Vice President Nixon on January 6. (Associated Press, January 6, 1959)

#### Soviet Commodity Sales

Mr. Mikoyan lavished praise on United States business. He said that Americans were better businessmen than the Russians and that for years the Soviet Union had to model herself upon American efficiency and American ways of organizing industry.

Mr. Mikoyan denied that the Soviet Union was trying to dump commodities in the international market. He said that charges that the tin market had been wrecked by Moscow were false. The trouble with tin, he asserted, started as long ago as 1956, long before the Soviet Union began her export trade in tin.

He also defended the recent Soviet sale of benzene to the Dow Chemical Company, insisting that the sale was made at the world market price if shipping costs were taken into consideration.

"All these fables of our being such terrible devils are not well founded," he said. "We want to trade in earnest. We want to get as high a price for our goods as we can and as low a price for the goods that we buy as any other businessman." (New York Times, January 9, 1959, reporting on the Cleveland visit)

#### US-Soviet Trade and Controls

1. Commenting on the artificial barriers preventing the expansion of trade between the United States and the Soviet Union, Mikoyan mentioned that even chewing gum, firewood, and laxatives are classified as "strategic goods" whose export from the United States to the USSR is banned. (From the TASS account of Mikoyan's Detroit visit. This statement is not reported in US press accounts of his talks in Detroit.)

2. After tasting the luxuries of capitalism, Mikoyan criticized this Nation's policies toward his homeland in a speech tonight.

"There was a time when you know that you could buy and sell from Russia," Mikoyan told the Economic Club of New York at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. "But it appears during the cold war you forgot."

"There are so many obstacles -- particularly in the form of legislation -- it is no wonder you forgot."

He recalled that back in the days of Henry Ford Sr., the auto maker had "dealing with our government," at a time when "your Government had no relations with us."

"But he didn't ask your Government," Mikoyan said. "And he did right."

"Today," Mikoyan complained, "businessmen have to hire a group of lawyers to find out what they can and can't sell to us. Recently we tried to buy some chemical equipment from your country here. But when it was not forthcoming, we asked the company 'why' and they said the State Department was checking it but made no decision."

"Now we are placing an order for the equipment in other countries while the United States is still contemplating."

Mikoyan said some items on the United States embargoes list to Russia were a fit subject for humor magazines. One such item, he said, was laxatives. (UPI report of Mikoyan's talk at the New York Economic Club)

Soviet Production of Consumer Goods

Replying to questions on the production of consumer goods, Mikoyan said that more and more of these goods are being produced every year. We are striving, he said, to develop the production of consumer goods even more in order to satisfy fully the growing needs of the people. We have drafted a large program for the production of consumer goods from synthetic materials. We are short of such materials and we would like to buy plants for their production in the United States. So far, we to our regret, see no noticeable advance in this direction. I can assure you, however, that our program will not suffer because of this and that we ourselves will expand the production of these and other materials. (TASS, January 13, 1959, reporting on Mikoyan's talk with UCLA faculty and students)

US and Soviet Standards of Living

1. Replying to the question of how Communism could benefit American workers, Mikoyan said: "If I gave a direct reply to this question I might be accused of spreading 'Communist propaganda' and interfering in the domestic affairs of the United States. But I can reply indirectly. In the Soviet Union, given the same degree of industrial development as in the United States, a working man would live twice as well as an American working man." (TASS, January 11, 1959, reporting on Mikoyan's speech at the San Francisco Press Club)

2. "The Americans today have a higher standard of living than ours. We also want a high standard of living. We would like to overtake the Americans, but this surely is no threat to you. You are living well. Why should you not want us to live well also. In fact, whether you like it or not, we are going to live well anyway of our own accord." (From Mikoyan's press conference in New York on January 15, 1959)

Stalin

Question: I want to ask how it is that you were the first speaker in the Soviet Union to criticize Mr. Stalin?...

Mikoyan: I wouldn't say I was the first one. The first one was Nikita Khrushchev who made the general report; perhaps there was a special taint in that, a special feature in that. Mr. Khrushchev was making the report on behalf of the Central Committee as a collective; so he had to be more cautious in his formulations.

Now, I spoke on my personal behalf and, therefore, I could be more outright in my criticism, but there is not the slightest difference in our views. (From Mikoyan's January 10, 1959 speech at San Francisco)